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Abstract: Irish tourism’s growth trajectory collapsed dramatically in 2008. By 2010, while
every other European destination had returned to growth the Irish crisis endured. This paper
examines the politics of tourism development that underpinned the crisis. Wilson’s (2000)
policy regime model is applied to map the state and private sector interactions that led to
developmental failure. It is argued that the policy paradigm that informed the vision for
industry recovery, the policy goals that emerged post crisis and the organisational structures
and power arrangements that existed between the state and the industry coalitions involved
with Irish tourism during the crisis of 2008 were far from optimum to the task of returning
the industry to growth. Keywords: development, crisis, politics, policy regimes,
state.  2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
INTRODUCTION
Following twenty years of impressive growth, in the second half of
2008 the Irish tourism industry collapsed dramatically (Fa´ilte Ireland,
2008). In 2009, in the first six months alone, British tourist numbers
were down over 300,000, continental European tourists were down by
over 60,000 and North Americans by 20,000 (ITIC, 2010). The Irish cri-
sis in 2008 was created in part by the ‘global’ crisis of Anglo-American
liberal capitalism, when financial and banking sectors imploded. But
the Irish version of the crisis is best described as multidimensional. It
began as a financial crisis. The banks lent heavily to builders and devel-
opers who bought land at hugely inflated prices. The crisis became fis-
cal as falling revenues diverged from spending commitments and vast
sums of public money haemorrhaged into the banking system (NESC,
2009, p. 2–3). By September 2009, unemployment was 429,400, a rise of
75% in the course of a single year.
The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) argued that
the crisis comprised five closely-related parts: banking, fiscal,Anne O’ Brien’s (Centre for Media Studies, NUI Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland. Email
<anneobrien@kairoscomms.ie>) forthcoming book The Politics of Tourism Development:
Booms and Busts in Ireland (to be published by Palgrave-Macmillan in 2011) highlights the
role of the state in the development of the Irish tourism industry, since the 1920s. An article
in Current Issues in Tourism 13(5) ‘‘Beyond Policy-making: Institutional regimes, the State
and Policy Implementation in the Irish Case’’ also explores this theme.
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complex set of global, international, European and national imbal-
ances and events (2009, p. ix). In short, the crisis was understood
as a combination of ‘‘declining competitiveness as a consequence
of the prolonged boom; a property bubble which Irish financial insti-
tutions and a regulatory system did not prevent; and an international
credit crisis and world recession caused by structural weaknesses in
the current globalisation process’’ (NESC, 2009, p. 18). For Irish
tourism, the crisis of 2008 led to a dramatic decline in the industry’s
fortunes. In just 18 months tourist numbers fell by one million
(Fa´ilte Ireland, 2009).
Unfortunately, state agencies and private sector actors proved unable
to prevent or to influence the effect of the crisis on the development of
tourism. This was because the politics that underpinned tourism devel-
opment prevailed against this. Irish national politics is overly con-
cerned with local constituency issues and, within this framework,
‘‘tourism’’ development had been increasingly shaped by the need
to generate local jobs and amenities rather than by a national pro-
gramme for genuine tourism development. In short, the policy regime
(Wilson, 2000) that came to the fore within the sector from the late
1990s had undermined its sustainable development and during the
2008 crisis, the regime proved fundamentally inadequate to the task
of either reversing the decline or generating growth.
The policy paradigm that emerged in the crisis was fundamentally
conservative, focusing on the ‘‘survival’’ of the sector instead of the
radical growth that was needed. Policy goals were equally unambitious
and emerged only within the public sector, with little awareness of
them on the part of private sector actors. The organisational
structures of the industry were compromised because of the changes
that had occurred in the early 2000s to state agencies. The power
arrangements within Irish tourism saw it increasingly dominated by
the private sector with less and less developmental control or regula-
tion from state agencies. As a result of the structure of the policy
regime, by 2011 the Irish tourism industry was still effectively
‘‘wasting a good crisis’’ by failing to achieve the levels of growth
required to reverse its collapse.THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENTAL FAILUREIn the tendency of many tourism researchers to focus on ‘practical’ or
‘applied’ studies . . . important aspects of political economy have been
virtually ignored . . .The mainstream of tourism research has either
ignored or neglected the political dimension of the allocation of tour-
ism resources, the generation of tourism policy, and the politics of
tourism development (Hall, 1994, p. 2–7).In response to this and similar challenges in the 1980s (Matthews,
1983; Ritcher, 1983a), analysts have since extensively examined the
political economy of tourism, through case studies of individual
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1983b; Williams & Shaw, 1998), through analyses of tourism in develop-
ing economies (Britton, 1982; Harrison, 1992; Jenkins & Henry, 1982),
by exploring the ideological and political nature of tourism (Hall,
1992; Hollinshead, 1992; Matthews & Ritcher, 1991; Urry, 1990); and
by examining the politics of tourism policy (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007;
Edgell, 1983; Hall, 1998, 2000; Jenkins & Hall, 1995; Nyaupane & Tim-
othy, 2010). In the latter vein, Pforr (2006, 2008), for example, devel-
ops a process-oriented policy model, incorporating a policy network
concept and temporal dimensions, to examine ‘‘the complexity of
tourism policy making’’ (2005, p. 323).
Policy analysis has, moreover, expanded to incorporate the issue of
policy implementation processes as well as the governance structures
that function to implement policy. As Hall commentsMany governments now develop national or regional tourism strate-
gies rather than plans. This is not just an exercise in semantics as
the notion of a strategy is a reflection of the development of the con-
cept of governance and its application to tourism, as in such situa-
tions a strategy tends to place a far greater emphasis on public-
private partnership arrangements (2008, p. 165).Hall highlights an important issue for understanding development,
which concerns the interactions of the political coalitions that are in-
volved in the generation and implementation of strategies. However,
with the exception of Go¨ymen (2000) and Krutwaysho and Bramwell
(2010), the literature often tends to reduce the role of the state to that
of government alone, and frequently the role of state agencies and
industry as institutional players are all but ignored. Some progress
on this latter issue is contained in Edgell’s work (Edgell, DelMastro Al-
len, Smith, & Swanson, 2008). He acknowledges that ‘‘When attempt-
ing to affect political decisions, the relationships of bureaucrats and
special interest groups is important to understand’’ (2008, p. 264).
Edgell uses public choice theory as a mechanism for understanding
these relationships and the process through which political decisions
are made for development. The framework is based on the premise
that decisions are made, not in the public interest, but rather in the
best interests of those making them (2008, pp. 263–264). Edgell fur-
ther elaborates that bureaucrats are motivated by achieving the mission
of their agency and rely on special interest groups to influence the leg-
islature, which leads to the potential for bureaucrats to be captured by
interest groups (2008, p. 264). This insight into the roles of state
bureaucracies and vested interests is seen by Edgell as an opportunity
for the industry to better understand policy generation and as a means
of promoting development but he acknowledges that public choice
theory has ‘‘yet to be widely applied to the practice of tourism’’
(2008, p. 265).
However, while public choice theory recognises the roles of the state
and private sector in tourism, it underspecifies the exact manner in
which these agencies engage to generate development. Hall begins
to address this gap by noting that within its coordination role, the state
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efficiency and cooperation in achieving economic goals (2008, p.
165). Dredge and Jenkins, however, note the negative potential of part-
nership by proposing, ‘‘governments have yielded to the private sector
too much discretion for making decisions that affect the public inter-
est’’ (2007, p. 144). Hall does concede that the economic reasons for
this reliance on partnerships ‘‘are themselves shrouded in political
rationales that relate to broader philosophical perspectives regarding
the question of what are the appropriate roles for the state and the
individual within society’’ (2008, p. 175).
Some clarification on this question is contained in the work of Krut-
waysho and Bramwell (2010) who note that policy implementation is
an interactive and negotiative process involving bargaining relations
between policy actors pursuing their interests. In turn, this generates
tensions around the state’s structural roles, the impacts of policies
on private sector interests and raises issues of legitimacy for governance
at the local level. More significantly, this analysis is based on Bramwell
and Meyer’s (2007) earlier critique of standard notions of structure
and agency within policy-making processes, which proposes that actors
engagements with state structures are dialectical. Therefore, Bramwell
and Meyer advance the policy debate beyond the usual ‘stages models’
(2010, p. 674) and focus instead on policy makers’ interactions, the
power structures within which they operate and their network connec-
tions, all of which should be understood as fluid rather than fixed.
These insights are immensely useful, and raise an ongoing challenge
for tourism analysts to examine more closely the dynamic nature of
state and private sector relationships, which, in turn, underpin both
the generation and the implementation of development policy, or in-
deed the failure to create or apply adequate development strategies,
as, for instance, during the Irish crisis of 2008.
This paper will add to these debates by describing the interactions of
the state and private sector in a crisis context (Blake & Sinclair, 2003;
Hall, 2010). With regard to crisis and its effect on development, there
are a limited number of studies that examine the impact of socio-eco-
nomic crisis, rather than what So¨nmez (1998) delimits as environmen-
tal or terrorist generated disasters. One such study is undertaken by
Okumus and Karamustafa who examine the impact of a 2001 economic
crisis on the industry in Turkey and find that, similar to Ireland, nei-
ther the government nor private organisations had adequate plans
for dealing with the crisis (2005, p. 942). Okumus and Karamustafa
note that the industry’s failure to respond to the crisis was because
of ‘major shortcomings in governance’ (2005, p. 956). However, this
latter study does not fully outline the specific politics that underpinned
this failure in governance. So, in order to examine the politics under-
pinning the outcomes of the Irish case more closely, this paper adapts
Wilson’s (2000) outline of policy regimes as a tool with which to map
the dialectical interactions between public and private sector coali-
tions, which determined the impact of the crisis on tourism’s develop-
ment strategy.
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contained in Bramwell & Meyer’s (2007) work but uses an alternative
construction of their concepts of context, power and policy by using
Wilson’s more formalised schema. Within this framework, policy re-
gimes are comprised of four dimensions: policy paradigms, policy
goals, power arrangements and organisations (2000, p. 258). The pol-
icy paradigm is the ideology or set of assumptions that shapes the way
that problems are perceived or defined, the types of solutions offered
and the kinds of policy proposed (Gusfield, 1981); Organisations are
those that exist within government, within policymaking arrangements
and within the implementation structure; Policy goals both embody
the goals of the policy regime and entail the ‘‘rules and routines of
the implementing agency’’ and power arrangements entail ‘‘the pres-
ence of one or more powerful interest groups supporting the policy re-
gime’’ and may occur in many different patterns (Wilson, 2000, pp.
257–258).
Policy regimes are useful for understanding the politics that under-
pin development because the model is both relational and dynamic,
with dialectical interactions occurring between the dimensions (Bram-
well & Meyer, 2007, p. 78). Determining how state and private sector
agencies influence development policy becomes a matter of examining
the policy regime configuration that is constructed, at these various
dimensional levels, around the development project. Thus, in order
to understand the failure to develop tourism post 2008, the policy re-
gime that existed between the public and private sector coalitions in-
volved is examined. By exploring the four institutional dimensions
within the sector, the issue of how the state and business class created
an institutional regime of developmental failure can be clarified.Study Methods
The article draws on a case study analysis conducted between 2008
and 2010. Case studies attempt to provide a multi-dimensional picture
of the case and are useful in explorations of relationships, patterns of
influence, and micro-political issues (Yin, 1989). Within the case study,
a grounded theory approach (Glasser & Strauss, 1967) was used to
guide the data collection, to create conceptual categories, to manage
the data analysis, to demonstrate relationships between conceptual cat-
egories and to develop the theoretical framework (Charmaz, 2003, p.
311). Data were collected through documentary analysis and semi-
structured interviews with key players. The interviews were conducted
with a sample of twelve key players in government departments, state
agencies, and private sector organisations concerned with tourism
development. The sample was collated through preliminary interviews
with informants who were incumbents in senior positions in leading
state and private sector organisations. These initial interviews explored
participants’ opinions and accounts of tourism development.
On that basis, further topics and questions emerged and other po-
tential interviewees were named and these avenues were subsequently
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focused on a key cohort who were at the centre of the development
process. Those interviewed included: a former Director General of
Bord Fa´ilte; a former Secretary General in the Department of An Taois-
each; a senior civil servant from the Department of Tourism; a former
Chief Executive of Tourism Ireland; a Senior Executive of Tourism Ire-
land; two former Chief Executives of the Irish Hotels Federation (IHF);
a Senior Executive of the IHF; two former Chief Executives of the Irish
Tourism Industry Confederation (ITIC), a current, Senior Executive of
ITIC and a Senior Strategist in Industry and Policy Development, at
Fa´ilte Ireland. The reported comments are generally representative
of the interviewee’s organisations. There was very little dissonance with-
in organisations; the main difference in accounts of the crisis was be-
tween state agencies and private sector organisations. The analysis
that follows draws in particular on data from three of the interviewees
because they were incumbent in their positions throughout the time of
the crisis.
The sampling process produced a small cohort of interviewees, but
all persons named as relevant by key players were approached. More-
over the resultant data were derived from state, semi-state and private
sector organisations, and, in this regard, provides a representation of
the views of the main interested groups. The generalisation to theory
from interview data was further underpinned by very extensive docu-
mentary analysis, which incorporated all official documents relating
to tourism development in Ireland from 2000–2010, all organisational
records that were available through libraries, databases or directly from
organisations, annual reports, policy reports and papers from both
public and private sector tourism organisations and legislative docu-
ments. The resultant, detailed case study analysis of the political econ-
omy of the collapse of Irish tourism growth is outlined in detail below.Tourism’s Policy Regime and Developmental Failure
In some respects, Irish tourism was experiencing difficulties prior to
the collapse in 2008. The decade 2000–2010 had shown some shifts in
terms of competitiveness, value for money and the origin, value and
behaviour of tourists. Tourism’s cost competitiveness began to deterio-
rate in the early 2000s due to relatively high labour costs, high domes-
tic inflation and the strength of the Euro against the dollar and sterling
(ITIC, 2008, p. 3). Annual inflation in the European Union between
2000 and 2006, was approximately 2% but in Ireland it averaged
3.6% and peaked at 4.8% in 2007 (CSO, 2008; Eurostat, 2008). These
factors all combined to make Ireland a high cost destination relative to
other European destinations. Moreover, tourist satisfaction declined
throughout this period: 63% of tourists found value for money in Ire-
land good or excellent in 2000, but this declined to 45% in 2002 and
16% by 2007 (Fa´ilte Ireland, 2003, 2007).
Demand had also fallen by 19% within the main British market,
while the domestic market increasingly dominated, following 15 years
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tourism’s developmental trajectory did not either acknowledge or ad-
dress these structural problems at the time. One Senior Executive at
Tourism Ireland comments ‘‘Through the course of the mid-naughties
we could see a price bubble starting to build in Ireland, driven largely
by domestic demand. The cost of living and inflation was going up, the
currency had become a big factor too, but nobody could have foreseen
the size and scale of what happened’’ (Anonymous, personal commu-
nication, December 2010). One of the dominant manifestations of the
tourism crisis was falling demand, which was felt particularly heavily in
the hotel industry. This was highly problematic, as the structure of the
sector had changed radically in the previous decade.
Until the 1990s, domestic smallholders dominated the Irish industry.
But the introduction of tax incentives for hotel development in 1994,
saw investors in hotel property claim 15% of the capital cost of a hotel
for each of the first six years of operation and the remaining 10% in
year seven, against tax liability. Between 1996–2006 the number of ho-
tel rooms doubled from 26,000 to 52,000 (Fa´ilte Ireland, 2008). This
period also saw the entrance of international chains to the Irish mar-
ket, not through ownership mechanisms, but rather through contrac-
tual agreements such as franchising, management and leasing
agreements with the owners of properties, predominantly property
developers. Just at the time when room stock capacity was at its highest
level ever, with 58,467 rooms in 905 hotels, demand dropped suddenly
in the second part of 2008 (Howarth Bastow Charleton, 2008b). Profit
levels on hotel rooms in Dublin fell by 8% as hotels were forced to in-
crease occupancy by reducing room rates.
By September 2009, Irish banks had US$10.18 (€7) billion in debt from
the hotel sector (Howarth Bastow Charleton, 2008a). Between 1997 and
2007, over 30,000 additional rooms and 480 new hotels had been built,
representing an investment of US$5.82 (€4) billion, and room stock
had increased by 98.7% over the previous ten years (Howarth Bastow
Charleton, 2008b). In November 2009, the Bacon Report, Over-Capacity
in the Irish Hotel Industry and Required Elements of a Recovery Programme, doc-
umented the bleak state of the hotel sector. The report constitutes a clear
articulation of the private sector’s understanding of, or policy paradigm
on the crisis. This report outlines what Wilson describes as the ideology
or set of assumptions that shapes the manner in which problems are per-
ceived and defined, which influence the types of solutions offered and
the kinds of policy responses proposed (2000, p. 257). In the case of
the tourism crisis, both industry and the state framed the situation as
one that the industry must ‘‘survive’’.‘‘Survival’’ as a Policy Paradigm
A full year after the publication of the Bacon Report, the private sec-
tor began to articulate publicly their ideological position on the crisis,
which was somewhat confused and lacked clarity about the causes of
the problem. As a Senior Executive at the IHF noted
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seriousness of the issues and some of them we must accept responsi-
bility for it would be too simple to say it’s government’s fault; we failed
in our role of ensuring that our overseas markets were being
addressed in the right way . . . I think we have a responsibility to help
the government agencies write the script; why should we think that
they know how to resolve it all because we don’t even know how to
resolve it all. I think it would be unfair to say that they don’t know
what to do, we all collectively don’t know what to do . . .we the private
sector need to meet and lead to some workable objectives (Anony-
mous, personal communication, 2010).ITIC were similarly slow to grasp the extent of the problems and un-
sure of the solutions. The organisation also presumed throughout 2008
that the industry was merely facing another short recession.We thought 2009 would be difficult with no growth and modest
growth in 2010 and back to normal by 2011. But we misread the situ-
ation. Things continued to get worse, and worse and worse . . .We
could have lived with the international downturn but the banking
thing on top of it put us in a really bad state . . .’’ (Anonymous, per-
sonal communication, November 2010).ITIC’s vision for a response to the crisis was still consolidating late in
2010.We need to regroup, we need to rebuild, we need to start over, we’ve
got to get the unviable businesses out of the way, the hotels business is
such a big part of tourism, we’ve got to sort out that capacity issue, I
wish I knew how but I can speculate that the market will prevail . . . If
we don’t get the overseas business back and growing at a much
greater rate than 2–3% we’re in big trouble, so there is room for a
major initiative but I don’t know what that is yet . . .(Anonymous, per-
sonal communication, November 2010).While the private sector was slow to germinate any policy position
around the crisis, the state agencies Fa´ilte Ireland and Tourism Ireland
were more proactive. A Senior Executive at Tourism Ireland elaborates
‘‘In the beginning of 2008 we launched a new global marketing cam-
paign and we adapted that as we went through 2008 to reflect a more
tactical focus, we started to push price messages into the campaign and
focused on ease of access and now in 2010 we have a major push on a
tactical campaign because of the issue of value for money’’ (Anony-
mous, personal communication, December 2010). Similarly, Fa´ilte Ire-
land’s business development strategy, devised in 2007, was recognised
to be obsolete by the middle of 2009 when the agency accelerated for-
ward a planning process for 2010–12. The main substance of this shift
in emphasis was to focus on product development.
As one of Fa´ilte Ireland’s senior tourism development strategists
explainsOur response to the crisis in 2008 was to adjust our role as a national
tourism development agency. We identified ten key tourism destina-
tions, so what that means is we’re abandoning or removing ourselves
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health board administrative region. What we’ve identified now is
ten key destinations and that’s a big shift in terms of the way we think
about tourism. We’ve clamped the geographies where our tourists go
and have inventories of everything in those destinations and we focus
all of our efforts in all of these destinations (Anonymous, personal
communication, November 2010).Another part of this initiative involved developing the tourism market.A significant part of developing a market is about advertising and
media but a significant part of it is about events and activities—so cre-
ating festivals, events, giving people a reason to come . . .We see two
strands of time 8am-8pm and 8pm-8am. The core problem for Irish
tourism is the former, the things to do and see. For decades it could
be argued we’ve been too light touch on this and we’ve been foot to
the pedal on the accommodation and food end. The real develop-
ment challenge, the deficit in Irish tourism, which has become much
more pointedly acute because of the crash in the last few years, has
been to go back and recognise the uncomfortable truth that the real
driver of tourism is not hotels or bars, those things are a derived
demand, a secondary demand that comes from a primary demand
which is to come to Ireland. As a development agency, since we were
established in 2003 we have been trying to turn that around (Anony-
mous, personal communication, November 2010).In explaining why Irish tourism for so long had overemphasised the
development of accommodation over product, Fa´ilte Ireland’s senior
strategist discusses the issue in terms of organisational interests and
regulatory capture of the state agencies by the private sector, which will
be discussed in further detail below in sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5.
In summary, the policy paradigm that informed the state and private
sectors’ responses to the 2008 crisis was very different across public and
private sides of the development ‘‘partnership’’. The former was proac-
tive in engaging with the reality of the crisis while the latter was slow to
solidify any policy position on the downturn in the industry. Moreover,
there was relatively little dialectical engagement at an official level
across industry and state agency boundaries around the best strategy
to pursue. For the first two years of the decline in tourism numbers,
the private sector largely focused on lobbying the state for funding
to ensure the survival of the sector, rather than contemplating a more
radical shift to an ambitious plan for growth as a solution to the crisis.
As a strategist from Fa´ilte Ireland put it, ‘‘We have to contribute to
tourism businesses in terms of helping them to survive through
this . . .’’ (Anonymous, personal communication, November 2010).
Arguably the agency that came closest to generating a growth-based re-
sponse was Fa´ilte Ireland. However, interestingly, the remit of that
agency since 2003 had been to focus on national or domestic develop-
ment and so although they responded to the crisis, their capacity to af-
fect change was bound up in the organisational politics and power
arrangements of the industry, which will be outlined in further detail
in sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5, but first the specific goals for tourism devel-
opment that emerged post-crisis will be examined.
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The policy goal response to the crisis was more specific and more di-
rectly articulated than the policy paradigm positions on the crisis. In
2009, the Tourism Renewal Group Report outlined a five-year frame-
work for action, which set targets for tourism growth of eight million
tourists by 2015, a compound growth rate of 7.9% with an associated
jobs target of 15,000 (Stationery Office, 2009). The Group’s report out-
lines in detail the policy that was to guide development and notesIrish tourism has the capacity, if supported and developed, to deliver
even more for Ireland as part of an export-led economic recovery.
Tourism has a strong role to play as a source of employment, is well
positioned for a green/sustainable development approach and has
a powerful influence on international perceptions and image of a
country (Stationery Office, 2009, p. v).Urgent policy actions required in 2009 included investment in mar-
keting, cutting access costs by abolishing the Air Travel Tax and
strengthening the tourism product. Spending was to be more co-ordi-
nated and sustainable enterprises and employment were to be under-
pinned by minimising costs such as wages, utilities and rates and by
ensuring access to working capital (Stationery Office, 2009, p. vi).
Midterm actions for recovery focused on ‘‘enhancing Ireland’s attrac-
tiveness in a global marketplace which is returning to modest growth,
building on gains in cost competitiveness and making sure that future
opportunities for growth are identified and nurtured’’ (Stationery Of-
fice, 2009, p. vii). The aims listed included: reaffirming the value and
importance of tourism, strengthening the innovative and knowledge
content of tourism; sustaining investment in tourism marketing; sus-
taining investment in people by retraining and strengthening skills;
and sustaining investment in the tourism product, which included
renewing ‘‘investment in priority projects, including funds for public
attractions and infrastructure and incentives for refurbishment of
accommodation’’ (Stationery Office, 2009, p. vii).
As a mechanism for managing the implementation of its policy, the
renewal group recommended establishing an Implementation Group,
which was put in place in July 2010. The State’s support for these
endeavors was evident in Budget 2010, which incorporated a range
of tourism measures. The overall tourism services budget was increased
by 3% to over US$222.7 (€153) million, including the maintenance in
real terms of funding for the Tourism Marketing Fund. Similarly, in
the Capital Infrastructure Priorities document, launched in July of
2010, an allocation of $232.9 (€160) million was made for product
development from 2011 to 2016. This funding was to be implemented,
ironically not through tax incentives, which had been the downfall of
hotel development, but instead by reinstating Bord Fa´ilte’s traditional
grant allocation process, whereby Fa´ilte Ireland would identify and
evaluate project applications using an independent grant advisory
group and through the approval of Fa´ilte Ireland’s Board.
However, while this provision of funding had the potential to assist the
state agencies in disciplining the private sector around the task of
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cific policy goal or framework articulated by the state agencies around
this agenda. The only official platform for engagements between public
and private bodies remained the Tourism Renewal Group. Essentially
there was a failure to create a dialectical engagement between public
and private sector coalitions around either policy creation or implemen-
tation. As a senior strategist comments, from Fa´ilte Ireland’s perspectiveThe private sector sees the bigger picture but they would say that turn-
ing the focus around to product development that’s a job for an
agency like Fa´ilte Ireland. A body like the IHF, its primary function
is to serve its membership—the people leading those groups will have
that focus (Anonymous, personal communication, November 2010).Moreover, despite Fa´ilte Ireland’s focus on policy goals for product
development, and the availability of funding, in relation to the level
of decline of tourism, the yearly growth targets of 3–4% set by the Tour-
ism Renewal Group were simply not ambitious enough even to reverse
the large-scale decline that the industry had suffered. Implementing
even these modest targets would require initiatives from the private sec-
tor but none of the private sector organisations named the renewal
group’s policy document or Fa´ilte Ireland’s plans as part of its vision
for future growth. This disjuncture in awareness of public and private
policy initiatives is perhaps best explained by a difference in priorities
between the private and public bodies as well as the complexity of the
organisational structures that underpin Irish tourism.Organisational Blocks on Progress
The structure of the developmental regime that had underpinned Ir-
ish tourism’s success changed fundamentally in the early years of the
2000s and arguably to the detriment of the industry’s development. In
2001, in response to the imminent establishment of an all-island tourism
board, Minister for Tourism Dr. Jim McDaid merged Bord Fa´ilte and
CERT, the tourism-training agency, into a single body (Da´il Debate, 14
Nov, 2001). This shift left staff unsure of how roles would be allocated
in the new merged body and how it would relate to the new all-island mar-
keting agency Tourism Ireland Ltd. (Zuelow, 2009, p. 231). The latter
was formed in 2002, not, crucially, as a result of any tourism industry
needs, but rather as part of the Northern Ireland peace agreement. Tour-
ism Ireland Ltd. adopted responsibility for the marketing of the island of
Ireland overseas, ran all overseas tourism offices and took over one hun-
dred of Bord Fa´ilte’s staff which, in turn, demoralised Bord Fa´ilte be-
cause its role in tourism was consequently much less clearly defined
but also much more limited (Zuelow, 2009, p. 229).
From 2001 to 2003 Bord Fa´ilte existed in limbo until the establish-
ment of a second state agency, the National Tourism Development
Authority, Fa´ilte Ireland, which was toEncourage, promote and support development and marketing of tour-
ist facilities within the state by overseeing education . . .developing
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and planning, pursuing advertising and publicity activities within the
Republic, and providing advice and consultancy services (Zuelow,
2009, p. 231).The new agency was less powerful than Bord Fa´ilte had been as it was
limited to promoting domestic tourism. But Fa´ilte Ireland was also ex-
pected to co-operate with Tourism Ireland Ltd. on specific niche prod-
uct offerings in the international market, which caused a lack of clarity
regarding the division of labour between the agencies.
A Senior Executive from the IHF observesWe ended up with two tourism organisations. We do worry about the
levels of duplication within these organisations . . . they’re in the same
water so it is very hard to separate the two, there is crossover and that
has a cost (Anonymous, Author Interview November 2010).Dividing the development and marketing agendas made no sense and
having two state agencies served only to complicate communications
and impede development. The tension this created between the agen-
cies came increasingly to the fore as the industry came under pressure.
Evidence of the private sector becoming more dissatisfied with the
work of Tourism Ireland was evidenced in a very public manner in a
radio interview on the national broadcaster Radio Telifis E´ireann in
mid-September 2010.
The IHF argued that the decline in the British market indicated an
abysmal failure of the current strategy for marketing Ireland. Paul
Gallagher, President of the IHF argued in the interview thatThe British market is in freefall . . . In terms of marketing, Ireland is
clearly doing something wrong if we’re losing tourists from Britain
at double the rate of our European competitors. Plain and simple,
there has been a disastrous failure to re-energise the British market
and get the message out that Ireland has tremendous value to offer
as a holiday destination (IHF, 2010).The IHF maintained that the over-riding issue was the inability of Tour-
ism Ireland to communicate effectively the range of attractions and the
value for money of the Irish product. Similarly ITIC’s July 2010 report
documented that ‘‘there was some concern expressed about a percep-
tion of confusion and lack of optimum efficiency in the dual agency
structure, Fa´ilte Ireland and Tourism Ireland’’ (ITIC, 2010, p. 43).
Moreover, the report also advocated a more radical review of agency
arrangements for tourism as a key recommendationA review of the State agencies involved in tourism is recommended,
while cognisant of the all-Ireland remit of Tourism Ireland. The par-
ticular challenges facing Ireland in a changed market environment,
together with the restrictions on public funding and the need for
the most effective marketing of the destination, combine to suggest
this is an opportune time to review the current organisational
arrangements . . .Key criteria for the review might include a fit for pur-
pose assessment, an efficiency audit as well as exploring opportunities
for shared services (ITIC, 2010, p. 54).
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with state agency arrangements for tourism emerged with the Restau-
rant Association of Ireland questioning the need for four tourism
agenciesI think we need to take a serious look at the purpose of Tourism Ire-
land, Fa´ilte Ireland, Shannon Development and Dublin Tour-
ism . . .We need to see if we’d be able to manage with one, or
maybe two agencies. That would lead to a much more . . .coordinated
approach (Sunday Times, 2010).Even a Senior Executive of Tourism Ireland acknowledged ‘‘If we
were starting again and there was no politics involved it might be en-
tirely different, but, at the end of the day, people have a clear vision
of the job that needs to be done and people may not appreciate the
north—south relationships that have developed and there’s huge ben-
efits that far outweigh what people might see as barriers . . .’’ (Anony-
mous, personal communication, December 2010). Fa´ilte Ireland
equally both acknowledged the incongruity of the split between agen-
cies but also accepted the necessity of continuing with current struc-
tures in light of their importance to the peace process in Northern
Ireland. As a Fa´ilte Ireland strategist commentedThe split between product and marketing—page one of the business
strategy book would say have it all in the one place, but the reasons
for it are in the Belfast agreement . . . their genesis was the peace set-
tlement, it’s a very political issue . . .and peace in Northern Ireland
isn’t a bad price to pay. In business terms it’s incongruous. It would
be better if people were in the one organisation but there’s no dupli-
cation. We meet, we talk, we work together in particular programmes,
tourism isn’t compromised by structures (Anonymous, personal com-
munication, November 2010).Although the sector may have adapted to less than textbook-standard
structures, it still nonetheless faces the ongoing challenge of reversing
a negative development trajectory and, in particular, the specific prob-
lem of accessing the political power structures that might fast-track a
more radical agenda for change.Power Struggles and Failure
Even when ITIC recognised impending problems within the indus-
try, they were unable to draw attention to the issues because of a disin-
clination within government to address any negative issues that
countered popular narratives of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ growth economy.
As a senior executive with ITIC commentsWe realised well before 2008 that there were problems in the industry,
and we flagged it publicly, with the Minister and with the agencies,
but large sections of the industry itself had trouble recognising
it . . .The response we got to the reports was that the industry is always
complaining . . .Ministers would be out talking to the grass roots and
hoteliers were busy . . . they don’t care who they’re busy with, Irish or
international tourists . . . the idea that there were problems wasn’t
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who talk down the economy should go and commit suicide . . . it could
only have been shifted by a charismatic leader who went before the
nation to decide what we were doing with the resources of the exche-
quer revenue . . .and we didn’t have the right kind of leadership in
politicians. . . and state agencies’ masters are the political system
and it doesn’t like state agencies flagging bad news . . . I would be
aware of issues where Bord Fa´ilte was told to back off . . .(Anonymous,
personal communication, November 2010).A senior strategist from Fa´ilte Ireland explains the problem in terms
of the power shifts that had occurred within the partnership of pubic
and private bodies. On the question of why tourism product develop-
ment, as opposed to accommodation, was neglected during the boom,
he saysThe private sector was driving a lot of policy and was quite dominant.
Without being critical, I think it conforms to textbook notions of reg-
ulatory capture. In many ways the private sector and state agencies
have a bilateral relationship and that evolves in a certain way depend-
ing on the balance and shifts of power between both actors and could
involve the capture of one party by another and there’s elements of
that in Irish tourism (Anonymous, personal communication, Novem-
ber 2010).Commenting specifically on the IHF role in this development, he
notesIn the hotel sector we had a very powerful lobby group, it was well
resourced, it had cash, it had financial and organisational muscle,
and so consequently it was prominent in decision making and cap-
tured a lot of political attention, and to this day that’s still true . . . they
have a leverage they can exercise (Anonymous, personal communica-
tion, November 2010).Essentially, the primary reason that the stage agencies were unable to
terminate the tax incentivisation of hotel development, or even shift
the incentives towards product development and tourism infrastruc-
ture were to do with the structures of the Irish political system.
As Fa´ilte Ireland’s strategist elaboratesIt probably reflects something about Irish politics and the very local-
ised nature of Irish politics . . .Tourism is an industry that’s in every
parish . . .and consequently it’s important politically and maps very
well onto our political mindset, which is very local. And the hotels
scheme reflects a sense in Irish society of trying to do something
everywhere . . . tourism infrastructure must cluster where people have
gone for decades. But for the last ten years we’ve had hotel develop-
ment that’s followed tax incentives, and that’s distorted development
and has shifted from a fundamental tourism business model to a tax
incentive model. Why did it happen? Again you had a powerful hotels
group in the form of the IHF who were keen to see this, and property
developers with profits they wanted to divert into hotels (Anonymous,
personal communication, November 2010).In essence, private sector organisations had captured public agencies
and these agencies, in turn, had no capacity to discipline the private
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because the state agencies’ political ‘‘masters’’, parliamentary politi-
cians, were interested primarily in local level or constituency-based
‘‘tourism’’ development and not concerned, as they should have been,
with the broader national tourism development strategy.CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that most other European destinations returned to
growth late in 2009 and early in 2010, Irish tourism remained in crisis.
The endurance of the Irish crisis is explained through the application
of Wilson’s schema. This shows the dominance of private interests over
state agencies, which led to the capture of the state developmental pro-
ject by a broader neo-liberal project. The policy regime that under-
pinned the sector was inadequate to the task of reversing the decline
and generating growth. This, in turn, was because of the nature of
the political interactions between the state and private sector coalitions
that underpinned the industry, which, rather than being balanced and
dialectical, were instead dominated by private sector interest groups.
The policy paradigm that was adopted during the crisis was fundamen-
tally conservative, focusing on the ‘‘survival’’ of the hotel industry
rather than the growth of the sector. Policy goals were relatively unam-
bitious and focused on maintaining equilibrium rather than radically
altering the industry’s approach at a policy level. Moreover, the organ-
isational structures of the sector were compromised because of the
changes that had been wrought in the early 2000s to state agencies,
leaving them severely fractured, and ineffective in addressing the pro-
found crisis. Similarly, the power arrangements amongst the actors
concerned with development saw the industry increasingly dominated
by the concerns of the private sector with less developmental input
from state agents.
The case of tourism’s decline examined in this paper goes some of
the way to beginning to address the question of why growth is occur-
ring more rapidly in the international market than in Ireland. For in-
stance, occupancy rates in Europe were up 5.4 percent in the third
quarter of 2010 and overnight visits were forecast to grow by 3.8% in
2011 (EU Commission, 2011). Similarly, Britain was expected to attract
30.0 million tourists in 2011, a rise of 1%, with a projected associated
spend in nominal terms to £17.2 billion, up £0.34 billion or 2% (Visit
Britain, 2011). While the recovery that has begun elsewhere raises
interesting possibilities for comparing the dynamics between state
and private interests among ‘‘recovering’’ and ‘‘failing’’ countries, this
paper is limited in scope to outlining the factors that have impacted
negatively on Irish tourism only. In this way the paper makes a number
of contributions to key theoretical debates in the political economy of
tourism. The study adds to analyses of the policy process by adapting
Wilson’s policy regime framework as a mechanism for mapping the dia-
lectical interactions of state and private sector coalitions at strategic
and operational levels. It engages with Bramwell and Meyer (2007)
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and dynamic character of the policy regime process. This policy regime
analysis outlines the fluid nature of connections between organisations
and shows how structures such as the sector’s power arrangements im-
pact on agents, as well as on policy paradigms and goals. But the study
also innovates on these analyses by showing the effect of breakdowns in
the dialectical relationship between the state and private sector agents
and how this can act to prevent recovery and impede development.
The paper also contributes to debates on the political economy of
Irish development, which have been very neglectful of the tourism
case. With the exception of Clancy (2009) and O’Brien (2011), most
examinations of Irish growth, even during the Celtic Tiger period, en-
tirely omitted to mention tourism as a feature or factor of growth, and
failed to acknowledge the vital role it played in job creation, right from
the beginning of the boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Equally,
theoretical debates on the Irish state as a Developmental State or a
Competition State (Kirby, 2002, 2010; Riain, 2004) have not acknowl-
edged the role of the state in the propagation of a strong indigenous
tourism industry. Even post-crisis, with the exception of O’Brien
(2010, 2011), relatively little academic attention has been paid to the
Irish tourism industry and its capacity for job creation, despite the les-
sons that can be learned from the growth of the late 1980s, which also
occurred during a global recession.
Within the international literature, the politics of tourism and its
development are addressed more frequently. However, while states
have become increasingly engaged with tourism as a means of achiev-
ing economic development and academic debate has become more fo-
cused on the politics of state development, the political features of the
state’s involvement with tourism development have not yet been
exhaustively outlined. Analysts have closely examined matters such as
the policy-making process, policy networks and interest groups’ im-
pacts on governments’ roles in development (Edgell, 2008; Pforr,
2005; Tyler & Dinan, 2001). Moreover, they have examined the broad-
er issue of the complex institutional politics that underpin the state’s
involvement in tourism policy creation as well as implementation
(Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Krutwaysho & Bramwell, 2010). However,
despite advances made within the analysis of the politics of tourism
development, this does not negate the importance of this theme for
the industry internationally; a fact which demands that the politics
underpinning the successes and failures of the industry continue to
be taken seriously by political economists, developmental state theo-
rists and within tourism studies in the future.REFERENCES
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